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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1..

This is not a case of D. Steven Brewster ("Steven") trying to take

advantage of Dana Brewster ("Dana") in the funding of the airport venture. In fact,
Steven told Dana about the airport opportunity and the need for $200,000.00 to fund the
project, as early as January of 2006. (Rec. 1033, ^Js 5-10; Rec. 1073, % 10). This fact is
undisputed. (Rec. 1188-1190).
2.

Steven did not misappropriate or withhold this opportunity from

Dana, but anticipated being equal partners with her; as he told her as early as January of
2006, that each of them would need to come up with $100,000.00 to fund the airport
venture as equal partners.1 (Rec. 537, fs 30-31; Rec. 1033, % 9-10). This fact is also
undisputed. (Rec. 1188-1990).
3.

Steven paid the first $ 100,000.00 of his own money to start the

project, relying on Dana's promise that she would pay the other $100,000.00; and they
would be equal partners. (Rec. 1190-1191). However, Dana never paid the other
$100,000.00 as promised. (Rec. 1073, % 13). This fact is also undisputed.2 (Rec. 1191).
4.

Steven paid the first $100,000.00 so the project could commence and

not be lost. (Rec. 1073, f 13). After this Dana had ample opportunity to pay the remaining

funding the airport venture outside of the core business of Roasters Corporation,
is a common and sound financial practice. (Rec. 1054-1056).
2

Although Dana claims that she had access to $100,000.00 through her 401k, IRA
and line of credit with her bank, it is undisputed that she never did paid this amount.
1

$100,000.00. Steven waited approximately eleven (11) more months, until November of
2006, for Dana to pay the remaining $100,000.00, which she never paid. (Rec. 1191).
5.

As a result of Dana's refusal to pay the remaining $100,000.00, as

promised, the Corporation's cash reserves (which had been accumulating over a 10 year
period) were used to pay the remaining $100,000.00 in November of 2006, so the project
could be completed. (Rec. 1034, If 12; Rec. 1073, U 13).
6.

The airport venture has been profitable. Dana does not dispute this,

but instead claims that she should be treated as an equal partner with Steven in the
venture, although she never risked investing $100,000.00 of her own money to be an
equal partner with Steven. (Rec. 541,143; Rec. 553 If 130).
7.

In October of 2006, Dana, instead of investing $100,000.00 to be an

equal partner with Steven, filed this derivative action against Steven and the other
Defendants, claiming that Roasters Corporation could have totally financed the airport
venture from within at the time; thus, making her an equal partner with Steven in the
venture, although she never personally invested $100,000.00 in the venture, like Steven.3
(Rec. 541, If 43; Rec 553, If 130)
8.

Margaret H. Olsen, was appointed as counsel, in this action, for the

Corporation and she retained a forensic accountant, Mr. Townsend, to conduct an inquiry

3

Because 6% of Roaster's shares were given to the three Brewster children (2%
each) on January 1, 2006, Dana now claims a share of 47%, rather than 50%.
2

under §16-10-740(4)(a) to determine if the maintenance of the derivative action was in
the best interest of the Corporation. Both Dana and Steven stipulated to use Mr.
Townsend, knowing his experience as a forensic accountant, to conduct the inquiry
required under §16-10-740(4)(a). (Rec. 1024, f 3; Rec. 1034,1f 15; Rec. 1045; Rec. 1074,
% 16). This is undisputed by Dana. (Rec. 1191).
9.

Mr. Townsend, a forensic accountant with 21 years experience

analyzing closely-held corporations, including their financial information and business
practices, (Rec. 1023, ^| 2); conducted an in-depth analysis to determine whether the
maintenance of the derivative action was in the best interest of the Corporation. (Rec.
1023-1068). To do this he analyzed all the books and records of the Corporation,
including financial statements and documents provided by both parities, as well as,
documents he specifically requested. (Rec. 1065).
10.

During the course of his investigation Mr. Townsend and his staff,

spent 80 hours interviewing witnesses, analyzing documents, researching information,
and even preparing an actual cash flow and hypothetical repayment plan. (Rec. 1024 &
1048). He lists at least nine (9) factors he considered in reaching his conclusion that it
was not in the best interest of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative action in this
case. (Rec. 1054-1056, Tfs 1-9)
11.

Mr. Townsend came to a definite conclusion. In his affidavit,

accompanying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss, he clearly states that the derivative

3

action should be dismissed in the best interests of the Corporation. (Rec. 1025-1026).
12.

At the hearing on March 30, 2009, Mr. Townsend testified regarding

his report, his affidavit and his conclusion. The court asked questions about the possibility
of the Corporation being able to raise the money to finance the airport venture from
within in 2006. (Rec. 1565, pgs. 57-58, 69-70 & 98).
13.

Mr. Townsend was clear in his testimony that the Corporation would

not have been able to fully fund the project from within in 2006. (Rec. 1565, pg. 57). Mr.
Townsend testified that with the cash on hand and short term payables, the Corporation
would not have been able to fund any more that it did. (Rec. 1565, p. 57).
14.

Mr. Townsend further testified (his testimony was undisputed) that it

was sound business judgment to go totally outside the corporation to fund the new airport
venture in this case; and that for a closely held corporation, as in this case, going outside
the corporation to finance a new project is quite common to protect the corporation from
further debt and/or possible liability if the venture fails. (Rec. 1565, pg. 63).
15.

At the end of the hearing, Mr. Townsend again testified that the

derivative action should be dismissed in the best interest of the Corporation. Mr.
Townsend's conclusion did not change after the court's inquiries at the hearing. (Rec.
1565, pg. 61).
16.

At the end of the hearing, the court found no bias or bad faith on the

part of Mr. Townsend. (Rec. 1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 98; Rec. 1506, ^ 1). Although it

4

raised the possibility of the Corporation factoring its accountants receivables in 2006 to
raise all the money needed for the airport project. (Rec. 1565, pgs. 57-58, 69-70 & 98).
17.

In response, Steven submitted a second declaration, stating why

factoring the accounts receivables of the Corporation in 2006 to fund the airport venture,
would not have been a good business decision. (Rec. 1464-1466). Mr. Townsend also
submitted a second affidavit, addressing the court's questions stating that factoring the
accounts receivables was not a viable option for the Corporation or a good business
decision and would have threatened the existence of the Corporation. Mr. Townsend
further indicated that even if the Corporation would have factored its accounts
receivables, it would not have had enough money to fully fund the airport project. After
considering the factoring of the accounts receivables, Mr. Townsend's conclusion
remained the same, that the action should be dismissed. (Rec. 1420-1486).
18.

The court in its Order denying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss,

did not deny the Motion because Mr. Townsend failed to articulate that it was in the best
interest of the Corporation to dismiss the action in his initial report; or because of an
uncertainty as to whether the decisions were made by a corporate officer or the board of
directors; or because this was the first case wherein Mr. Townsend was asked to make
such a determination. Rather, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss because it
questioned whether the Corporation did all it could do at the time to fund the airport
project. (Order, ^ 2; Rec. 1506).

5

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appeal in this case concerns the trial court's role and the scope of its
review under §16-10a-740 (4)(a). Therefore, the proper standard of review concerning
the trial court's application of the Statute in this case, is one of correctness. Summit
Water Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'l Water SpecialServ. Dist.,10% P.3d 119 (Ut.App
2005). The issue subject to the abuse of discretion review in Peller v. Southern Co., 911
F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990) cited by Dana, did not involve the court's interpretation
of a statute, but the trial court's finding that the companies involved failed to establish the
necessary good faith. Id. at 1538. When statutory interpretation and novel questions of
law are raised in a motion to dismiss a derivative action, a de novo review has been
applied by the courts. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003);
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000); In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 801 A.2d
295, 313 (NJ. 2002).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dana in her brief raises a number of arguments that are irrelevant to the trial
court's ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss and the appeal of the court's Order, which
was entered in this case. For example, Dana complains that Townsend's conclusion is not
well articulated in his initial report to Corporate counsel. However, Mr. Townsend made
it clear in his affidavit, at the end of the hearing, and again in his second affidavit; that it

6

is not in the Corporation's best interest to proceed with the derivative action.4 The trial
court did not deny the Motion to Dismiss because Mr. Townsend failed to reach such a
conclusion.
Dana also tries to raise an issue as to whether the funding decisions were
made by Steven as a corporate officer or by the board of directors. However, this is not a
reason, nor was it given as a reason, for the court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss.
Dana also complains that the Corporation made only one inquiry into obtaining a loan to
fully fund the project, again this was not the reason the Motion to Dismiss was denied,
besides it is common knowledge in the financial community that such a loan to a small
family business, as in this case, would require the personal guarantees of the principal
owners. This was not the reason why the court denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Dana also argues that this is the first case wherein Mr. Townsend has been
asked to make such a determination; although she admits that she stipulated to use Mr.
Townsend knowing his past experience and background as a forensic accountant.5 Again
the trial court did not deny the Motion to Dismiss based on the lack of Mr. Townsend's
experience or qualifications. Dana further argues that Mr. Townsend would not have

4

Mr. Townsend's response in his report, that this is a question of fact or law, but
not an accounting question, deals with the existence of fiduciary duties. In response to
whether to maintain the derivative action, however, Mr. Townsend goes on in more detail
and lists nine factors he considered in his analysis. (Rec. 1054-1056, ^fs 1-9)
5

Dana waived any objections to Mr. Townsend's experience and qualifications
when she stipulated to use him to make the determination under §16-10a-740 (4)(a).
7

been comfortable making such an investment without more information. However,
whether Mr. Townsend would have been comfortable is not relevant to Mr. Townsend's
conclusion or the Motion to Dismiss; and this was not the reason given for the court's
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, besides Steven and Dana have far more experience in the
retail coffee business than Mr. Townsend, and both Steven and Dana thought it was a
good opportunity. (Rec. 1565, pg. 55).
The trial court did not deny the Motion to Dismiss based on any of the
above issues or arguments, and there is no finding of such on the record or in the court's
Order. Furthermore, the court specifically found that there was no question, evidence or
argument presented, challenging Mr. Townsend's good faith. (Order ^f 1, Ex. "A" to
Opening Brief, Rec. 1506). Therefore, there was no finding of any bad faith, lack of
independence, conflict of interest, or lack of objectivity, on the part of Mr. Townsend and
the Motion was not denied on this basis.
The reason for the court's denial of the Motion was because the trial court
question whether the Corporation should have, and would have been able to, fund the
airport project by factoring its accounts receivables. Therefore, the issue on appeal is
whether the trial court properly exercised its role in denying 1he Motion to Dismiss,
brought under §16-10a-740 (4)(a), because it had questions as to whether the Corporation
did all it could to fund the project. (Order 1 2 , Ex. "A" to Opening Brief, Rec. 1506).

8

The determination as to whether the Corporation is required to fund the
project from within and whether it would have been a good business decision for the
Corporation to factor its accounts receivables, at the time, in an attempt to fully fund the
project from within; is not a determination that the trial court should attempt to make as
part of its review under §16-10a-740 (4)(a).6 This is a "business decision" best left to
business professionals. In fact, according to Mr. Townsend, (and his testimony was
undisputed) Steven exercised sound business judgment in attempting to go outside of the
Corporation to fund the new airport venture; and that such a practice is commonly done in
closely held corporations. This protects the corporation from further debt and/or possible
liability if the venture fails. (Rec. 1565, p. 63). Therefore, whether the Corporation did
all it could to fund the project from within in 2006, is not a reason to deny the Motion to
Dismiss. Furthermore, according to Mr. Townsend factoring the accounts receivables in
2006, would not have been a viable business option at the time, but would have been a
bad business decision, putting the Corporation's very existence at risk. See Townsend's
Second Affidavit, addressing the court's questions.7 (Rec. 1420-1486).

6

There was no evidence presented at the hearing by a business professional or any
other person, that the Corporation should have, or could have, factored its accounts
receivables to raise enough money to fully fund the new airport venture.
7

This further enforces the argument that this is a business decision best made by
business professionals, familiar with such financial matters, and not the courts. The Utah
legislature recognized this when it passed §16-10a-740 (4)(a), providing that when such a
determination has been made after a reasonable inquiry, the court shall dismiss the
derivative proceeding. §16-10a-740 (4)(a).
9

Mr. Townsend was clear in his testimony that sound business judgment was
used to fund the airport project and that the Corporation would not have been able to fully
fund the project in 2006. (Rec. 1565, pg. 57). Mr. Townsend testified that with the cash
on hand and the short term accounts payable, the Corporation would not have been able to
fund more that it did. (Rec. 1565, pg. 57). Most important, the trial court did not find that
any of the financial procedures or the business methods employed by Mr. Townsend in
reaching his conclusion, were improper or unreasonable.
Therefore, regardless, as to whether the Corporation could have fully
funded the airport project, or did all it could do to fully fund the project in 2006; Steven
acted with sound business judgment in attempting to finance the venture outside the
Corporation; and Mr. Townsend9s conclusion, that the matter should be dismissed
remains unchanged, and the Motion to Dismiss should have been granted.
Mr. Townsend determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable
inquiry into the matter, that the maintenance of the derivative action in this case is not in
the best interest of the Corporation. Therefore, under the "shall" requirement of §16-10a740(4)(a), the trial court should have dismissed the derivative proceeding, rather than
trying to impose its own business judgment, questioning the business judgment and
conclusions reached by Mr. Townsend under §16-10a-740(4)(a).
Utah's Statute does not allow the court to examine the reasonableness of the
conclusions reached, by imposing its own business judgment, as Dana asserts; but only to

10

determine if a reasonable inquiry has been made. If a reasonable inquiry has been made
in good faith, the conclusion reached under §16-10a-740(4)(a) should not be disturbed.
The court did not make any finding that the information or evidence considered by Mr.
Townsend was insufficient; nor did the court find that any of the investigative procedures
or methods employed by Mr. Townsend in his investigation were unreasonable.
Finally, the cases cited by Dana are not on point with the majority of cases
or with Utah's Statute. Utah's Statute, unlike Florida's, does not provide that the court
"may" dismiss the action, but states that the court "shall" dismiss the action. Furthermore
unlike Delaware, Utah's Statute does not allow or require the court to take the additional
step of applying its own independent business judgment to determine whether the action
should be dismissed. If the Utah legislature wanted to provide the courts with such
discretion, it would have used the word "may" instead of "shall" in the Statute; and the
Statute would provide "that the court is to take the additional step of apply its own
independent business judgment to determine whether or not to dismiss the action."
Utah's Statute does not provide such discretion to the courts.
§16-10a-750(5)(a) is not Determinative in this Case. If the parties sought
a settlement or a dismissal of the derivative action by some other means, other than a
Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a), then perhaps §16-10a-750(5)(a)
would apply. This appeal is from the denial of a Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to §1610a-740(4)(a), which provides that the court "shall" dismiss the action; therefore, it is the

11

interpretation and application of the specific provisions provided in §16-10a-740(4)(a)
and the use of the term "shall" that should apply in this appeal, and not the general
requirement for court approval found in §16-10a-750(5)(a).
Furthermore, "court approval" is not defined in §16-10a-750(5)(a) as the
court applying its own independent business judgment to decide a Motion to Dismiss
brought under §16-10a-750(4)(a); and if a motion to dismiss is properly granted under
§16-10a-750(4)(a), as it should have been in this case, then such a dismissal would have
been with the necessary court approval.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ONLY REASON FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL
OF THE CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS ITS
QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE CORPORATION DID
ALL IT COULD TO FUND THE AIRPORT PROJECT.
A.

The trial court in its ruling did not find any bad faith,
a lack of independence, or that improper investigative
procedures and methodologies were used.

An appellate court's review is strictly limited to the record presented on
appeal. Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record. Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110,116 (Utah 2000); cf Call v. City ofW. Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049,
1052 (Ut.App. 1990) (a party has the burden of preserving the record and providing the
reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations).

12

Although argued by Dana in her appeal brief, the trial court did not find any
bad faith on the part of Mr. Townsend in denying the Motion to Dismiss. In fact, the
court found that there was no question, evidence, or argument presented to challenge Mr.
Townsend's good faith. (Order ^f 1; Rec. 1506). The court also did not find that there
was any a lack of independence on the part of Mr. Townsend; and did not find that the
investigation and the documents reviewed by Mr. Townsend, {i.e., the interviews
conducted, the financial statements analyzed, the cash flow and debt plans prepared, and
other documents reviewed) were insufficient or unreasonable. Furthermore, most
important, the court never found that the investigative procedures and methodologies
employed by Mr. Townsend were improper or unreasonable.
The trial court denied the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss because it had
questions whether the Corporation did all it could to fund the project. (See Order, ^f 2;
Rec. 1506). Therefore, Dana's arguments that the inquiry was not made in good faith,
that it was biased, or that it was not supported by the evidence; are not relevant to the trial
court's ruling and Order denying the Motion to Dismiss based on whether the Corporation
did all it could, to fund the project.8

8

Although Dana references the transcript where Mr. Townsend responded to a
number of questions on these different matters. These were not reasons given by the
court, and Dana has failed to provide this Court with any record, that the trial court denied
the Motion to Dismiss based on any of these arguments. Gorostieta, supra, at f 16.
13

B.

The question as to whether the Corporation should have tried
and would have been able to factor its accounts receivables
at the time, to fully fund the project, is a business judgment
for the business professional to decide and not the court

Utah's Statute as to the dismissal of a derivative proceeding is clear. "A
derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a
person or group specified in Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith after
conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the corporation."
§16-10a-740 (4)(a) (emphasis added).
The trial court in denying the Motion to Dismiss in this case, stated that it
had questions as to whether the Corporation did all it could to fund the airport project at
the time and questioned whether the Corporation could have factored its accounts
receivables to fully fund the project. The trial court apparently makes this determination,
without any evidence being presented at the hearing, by any business professional, or
expert with experience in this area; that factoring the accountants receivables would have
been a viable option for the Corporation. There was no testimony at the hearing that
factoring the accounts receivable should have been something considered as an option for
the Corporation to fund the airport project. The trial court apparently made this business
decision on its own without any testimony, or evidence, to support it. This determination
is not a legal question for the court; but a business decision, best left to business
professionals. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y.App. 1979) ("courts are
14

ill-equipped to evaluate business judgments: while corporate directors, and others in the
field, are much better qualified to make such decisions"); Abromowitz v. Posner, 513
F.Supp 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("we are precluded from substituting our uniformed opinion
for that of experienced business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest
in the outcome").
The fact that this determination should not be made by the court is evident
from the trial court's questioning in this case about factoring the accounts receivables to
raise enough money to fully fund the airport project; as factoring the accounts receivables
would not have raised the money necessary, but would have been a bad business decision
putting the very existence of the Corporation at risk. (Rec. 1464-1466, fs 4-8; Rec. 14201425, t 8).
The question as to whether the Corporation should have tried to raise the
money from within in 2006 to fully fund the airport project, and would have had the
ability to do so, is not a legal question, but a matter of business practice. This is a
question that should be answered by the business professional on a Motion to Dismiss
brought under §16-10a-740 (4)(a), and not by the court. Auerbach, supra, at 1003.
C.

If the court is to exercise its own business judgment in
determining whether to proceed under §16-10a-740(4)(a);
then what is the purpose of this Statute ?

The Defendants are not contending that the trial court should just rubber
stamp the determination made under §16-10a-740(4)(a), the court should verify that the
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determination was made in good faith and after a reasonable inquiry. However, this does
not mean that the court is to impose its own independent business judgment, contrary to
that of the business professional specified under the Statute. If this was intended, the
legislature could have easily written the Statute to provide for de novo review by the
court, or for the court to impose its own independent business judgment, in determining
whether to dismiss the action. Rather, the Statute specifically provides that the court
"shall" dismiss the action, after a reasonable inquiry has been made in good faith; it does
not provide that the court shall substitute, or impose, its own business judgment for the
person specified under the Statute, to make that determination.
Statutes are to be construed according to their plain language. LKL
Associates, Inc. v. Farley, 94 P.3d 279, 281 (Utah 2004); Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 84 P.3d 1197 (Utah 2004). They are to be interpreted in
such a manner as to give meaning to all their parts, and to avoid rendering any portions
superfluous. Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 89 P.3d 113 (Utah 2004).
The Statute in this case does not state that the court "may" dismiss the
action after applying its own business judgment; but to the contrary, it provides that the
court "shall" dismiss the action. §16-10a-740(4)(a). When examining the plain language
of a statute it must be assumed that each term included was used advisedly. Carrier v.
Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, f 30 (Utah 2004). In statutory construction the word
"shall" is presumed mandatory. Rogers v. West Valley City, 142 P.3d 554,120 (Ut.App.

16

2006); Pugh v. Draper City, 114 P.3d 546 Tf 13 (Utah 2005); Landes v. Capital City Bank,
795 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1009).
Furthermore, the Statute does not state that the court is to review the
reasonableness of the decision reached and second guess the decision reached by
imposing its own business judgment; rather the court is only to determine if a "reasonable
inquiry" was made. The term "reasonable" is used in the Statute immediately before the
word "inquiry" to define the type of "inquiry," made, i.e. a "reasonable inquiry." This
does not allow the court to reevaluate or second guess the conclusion reached by
imposing its own business judgment.
A reasonable inquiry was made in this case. A reasonable inquiry is not
made when the investigation is so restrictive in scope or so shallow in execution, or
otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted, that it constitutes a pretext or sham that would
raise questions of good faith. 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations § 1975; In re PSE & G
Shareholder Litigation, 801 A.2d 295 (N.J. 2002); In re UnitedHealth Group Inc.,
Shareholder, 591 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1029 (D.Minn. 2008); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.
2d 994; 47 N.Y.2d 634-35.
The cases cited by Dana in her brief do not interpret Utah's Statute, at issue
in this case, are not in line with the plain language of §16-10a-740(4)(a), which provides
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that the court shall dismiss the derivative action after a reasonable inquiry has been made,
(emphasis added) The Florida Statute, cited by Dana and interpreted in Batur v.
Signature Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., 903 So.2d 985 (Fla.Ct.App. 2005), is
clearly inapposite to Utah's, as it provides that the court "may" dismiss a derivative
proceeding. Fla. Stat. § 607.07401. Furthermore, even the Florida Court of Appeals held
that the proceeding may be dismissed if there is no bias, conflict of interest, objectivity,
and a reasonable investigation has been made. Batur v. Signature Properties of Northwest
Florida, Inc., 903 So.2d 985, 995 (Fla.Ct.App. 2005). There was no question of bias,
conflict of interest, objectivity, or of the procedures or methods used in this case.
In the other case cited by Dana, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981), the motion to dismiss was not brought under a specific statute, such as
Utah's Statute, but was treated as a hybrid summary judgment motion, a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b), and a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). Id. at ^s 46-48.
The court under such circumstances applied a Rule 56 standard and was allowed to apply
its own business judgment to decide the motion.
Utah's statute does not provide the courts with such discretion and it is
consistent with the majority of jurisdictions which provide that if an independent
committee conducts a reasonable inquiry in good faith, the substantive aspects of the
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committee's decision are not subject to judicial inquiry. See Davidowitz v. Edelman, 583
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1992) (the court may not inquiry into the merits of the special committee's
determination, as the courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what
are and must be essentially business decisions); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1979) (while court may inquire as to qualifications and procedures of an independent
litigation committee, good faith exercise of their business judgement is immune from
attack by the courts); cf. Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.App.
1988); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990); Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors,
548 F. Supp 1146 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
See also Parkoffv. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 425 N.Y.S.2d
762 (business judgment rule bars judicial inquiry into determination by special litigation
committee unless there is evidence of bad faith or fraud); In re General Tire & Rubber
Co. Securities Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984) (Ohio law precludes unnecessary
judicial interference with decision of committee to forgo litigation of derivative claims);
and Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.App. 1999) (judicial review of a
committee's recommendation is limited to determining whether the committee is
independent and conducted its investigation in good faith).
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There is no question but that Mr. Townsend, stipulated to by the parties, is
independent and that he conducted his inquiry in good faith. The court did not find his
investigative procedures, or the methods he employed, to be improper or unreasonable;
but rather questioned the conclusions that he reached. Mr. Townsend9s conclusion, not to
proceed with the derivative action, is a business decision he reached in good faith, based
on a number of factors he considered, using his best business judgment. His conclusion,
reached in good faith and after a reasonable inquiry, should be followed and the matter
should be dismissed, under §16-10a-740(4)(a).
IL

WHETHER THE CORPORATION COULD HAVE FULLY
FUNDED THE AIRPORT VENTURE IN 2006, IS NOT
GROUNDS FOR DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
Mr. Townsend was clear in his testimony that the Corporation would not

have been able to fully fund the airport project in 2006. (Rec. 1565, pg. 57). Mr.
Townsend testified that with the cash on hand and the short term accounts payable, the
Corporation would not have been able to fund more that it did. (Rec. 1565, pg. 57). The
court, while questioning his conclusion, did not state or find any problem with the
investigative procedures or the methods employed by Townsend to reach his conclusion.
The court did not find that his investigative procedures or methods were unreasonable.
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However perhaps more important, regardless of the Corporation's ability to
factor the accounts receivables to fully fund the airport project in 2006, Mr. Townsend
testified (and his testimony was undisputed) that Steven used sound business judgment in
his attempt to go outside the corporation to fund such a new venture; and that for closely
held corporations, such as in this case, going outside the corporation to fund a new
venture is quite common, because doing so protects the corporation from further debt
and/or future liability if the venture fails.9 (Rec. 1565, pg. 63)
Therefore, regardless, as to whether the Corporation could have fully
funded the project in 2006, or did all it could to fully fund the project in 2006; Steven
acted with sound business judgment in attempting to fund the airport venture outside the
Corporation; and therefore, Mr. Townsend's conclusion remained the same. The trial
court should have deferred to Mr. Townsend's recommendation under §16-10a-740(4)(a)
and should have granted the Motion to Dismiss, regardless of the Corporation's ability to
fully fund the airport project in 2006.

9

Dana actually incurred a benefit from this as a shareholder of Roasters, as the
Corporation did not incur any debt to service, allowing higher profits and dividends.
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III.

SINCE A MOTION TO DISMISS WAS FILED PURSUANT
TO § 16-10a-740(4)(a) AND DENIED; IT IS THIS SECTION
OF THE STATUTE THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THIS
COURT'S REVIEW, AND NOT § 16-10a-750(5)(a).
If the matter was being discontinued or settled by the parties, then §16-10a-

740(5)(a) may require court approval. However, in this case a Motion to Dismiss was
filed by the Corporation pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a), which provides that the court
"shall" dismiss the proceeding. It is the denial of this Motion that is being appealed in
this action; therefore, it is §16-10a-740(4)(a) that should be applied in this Court's review
of the trial court's denial and not §16-10a-740(5)(a). As stated above, if court approval
was required to dismiss a proceeding under §16-10a-740(4)(a), the legislature would not
have used the word "shall" in the Statute, but would have used the word "may" and would
have said "upon the court's approval."
Furthermore, "court approval" is not defined in §16-10a-750(5)(a) as the
court applying its own independent business judgment to decide a Motion to Dismiss
brought under §16-10a-750(4)(a); and if a motion to dismiss is properly granted under
§16-10a-750(4)(a), as it should have been in this case, then such a dismissal would have
been with the necessary court approval.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Townsend after an extensive investigation and in-depth analysis of the
relevant financial statements, and other documents provided, found that Steven acted
under sound business principles, and within the business judgment rule, in structuring the
airport opportunity and financing the project, outside of the Corporation. Mr. Townsend
concluded in his report, citing nine (9) specific factors that it was not in the best interest
of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims.
Based on his conclusion the Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Derivative Claims, pursuant to § 16-10a-740(4)(a), which provides that the court "shall"
dismiss the derivative claims on motion by the corporation after a good faith and
reasonable inquiry has been made.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss because it questioned whether
the Corporation did all it could to fully fund the airport project in 2006. The court did not
find any bad faith, insufficient evidence, or that the investigative procedures and methods
employed by Mr. Townsend in his investigation, were unreasonable or improper. Rather,
the court questioned the conclusions reached by Mr. Townsend and whether factoring the
accounts receivables was a viable business option for the Corporation to fully fund the
project in 2006. However, such a question is a business decision that should be left to the
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business professional to determine in good faith and after a reasonable inquiry; and not
for the court to independently determined in its review under §16-10a-740(4)(a)
If the court is to independently make such business decisions in ruling on a
Motion to Dismiss under §16-10a-740(4)(a); then what is the purpose of the Statute ? and
why does the Statute direct that the court "shall" dismiss the action ? The purpose of the
Statute is to allow the business professional to make the business decisions and reach a
conclusion whether to proceed or not; the court, is to make sure that there is no bias or
bad faith and that a reasonable inquiry has been made. The court is not to second guess
the substance of the conclusions or impose its own independent business judgment in
trying to decide such business matters.
The conclusion in this case was reached by Mr. Townsend in good faith and
after a reasonable inquiry was made. The trial court overstepped its bounds in denying
the Motion to Dismiss by imposing its own business judgment on Mr. Townsend5s
conclusions.
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Therefore, the Order denying the Motion to Dismiss entered in this case,
should be reversed and the derivative proceeding should be dismissed.
DATED this /*/

day of December, 2009.

BOND & CALL, L.C.

jr i~**C *£** OPr £^Z-£<_ ^
\J£evin Borfa,
Budge W. Call,
Attorneys for Brewster Defendants
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